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Reply and Access in the Newspaper Press
Why do we care about a right of reply?' A right of reply permits a
person who is attacked to respond in her own words. One way to under-
stand a right of reply is by distinguishing it from a right of retraction. A
retraction provides a remedy to a person who believes that something has
been published concernin' her that is false, or at least incorrect in some
respect. If the publisher is willing to grant a retraction, the publisher
then states in the same forum in which the falsehood or misstatement
occurred that the publisher erred. The retraction is composed by the
original publisher. The retraction, therefore, still leaves editorial respon-
sibility with the publisher. The publisher is still in control.
A right of reply, on the other hand, depending on the conditions
upon which the right may be invoked, leaves the formulation of the reply
with the person attacked. Because the person attacked is the author of
the reply, a right of reply more effectively contributes to the creation of
lively debate than does a retraction. To put it another way, retraction
cleanses the information process. It purges it of error. But reply permits
the introduction of new material and ideas into the discussion. For that
reason, a right of reply stimulates debate.
A right of reply equips the public with an opportunity to participate
in the media. Broadly speaking, this opportunity to participate includes
the right of reply and the right of access, but each has a separate mission.
The mission of the right of reply is to bring a measure of full disclosure as
well as authenticity to debate. In the context of a right of reply, choice of
the debate topic has been made by the publisher. The right of reply per-
mits an individual to respond to something that a publisher has already
made an issue. The mission of a right of access, however, is to allow, in
some circumstances, individuals other than the publisher to set the
agenda for debate.
A right of access, like a right of reply, is difficult to discuss in gen-
eral terms because the conditions for its invocation would necessarily de-
pend on the statutory provision that gives it life. A critical feature of a
right of access, however, is that it is not triggered by a first espousal by
the publisher. A right of access may recognize a right of entry for a
particular viewpoint or idea whether or not there had been a first es-
pousal of that idea within the forum. A right of access, by definition,
tempers the editorial autonomy of the forum's editor. A right of access
1. This article is the outgrowth of a speech by the author delivered at the annual conven-
tion of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Montreal,
Canada. The paper was one of several that were delivered at a panel presentation on the topic
"Right of Reply and the Press: A Comparative Perspective."
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empowers members of the public with a measure of editorial choice. Both
the right of reply and the right of access have been bitterly resisted by the
media.
Reply and access have been resisted by the media on the ground that
they fatally interfere with the autonomy and discretion of the editor. The
media maintain that they alone should decide what should be dissemi-
nated to the public. This theory of absolute sovereignty has largely pre-
vailed over the interests of the public in a right of reply.
In this article, I will discuss the current status of the rights of reply
and access in the United States, in addition to the consequences of the
successful resistance to the recognition of these rights. I shall suggest
that there has been in recent years a resurgence of interest in the right of
reply in the United States as well as a renewed expectation of direct pub-
lic participation in the media.
If I were merely discussing the status of a right of reply to the news-
paper press in the United States at the present time, this article would be
brief. There is no right of reply; this was decided conclusively in 1973 by
the United States Supreme Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo.2
In 1972, Pat Tornillo, head of the Dade County, Florida, Classroom
Teachers Association, ran as the Democratic candidate for the Florida
legislature. The Miami Herald published two editorials attacking his
candidacy. Tornillo submitted replies to the Herald that he asked it to
publish, which the Herald refused to do. In most states, that would have
been the end of the matter. When a newspaper refuses to publish the
proffered reply even of someone it has attacked, such an action is not
considered to be censorship but, instead, the exercise of editorial discre-
tion. The Florida situation, however, was unusual. Florida actually
had a right of reply law designed precisely for political candidates and for
a situation like Tornillo's. A provision of the Florida Electoral Code
3
dealt with the exact situation: if the publisher of a newspaper assailed
the personal character of any candidate or charged him with malfeasance
or misfeasance in office, then the newspaper, upon request of the candi-
date, must publish free of cost any reply the candidates submits. The
reply, however, could take no more space in the paper than the original
attack.4 The statute, passed by the Florida Legislature in 1913, had been
largely dormant since its enactment.
Encouraged by the rise of a movement for access to the press, Pat
Tornillo sought to avail himself of the Florida right of reply law.
2. 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
3. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (West 1973).
4. Id.
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Tornillo sought a mandatory injunction to enforce the statute. The
Miami Herald refused to comply with the law on the ground that the
statute violated the First Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court dis-
agreed and held, six to one, that the statute did not violate the First
Amendment but, indeed, implemented it.5 The Supreme Court of the
United States unanimously reversed the Florida Supreme Court and in-
validated the Florida right of reply statute.6
The Tornillo case was a First Amendment case of first impression.
There was no United States Supreme Court case in existence that dealt
with the question whether the editor of a newspaper could be compelled
to give space to another even to respond to an attack. This was not a
case of preventing the press from publishing or of punishing the press
after it had published. Tornillo raised the issue of whether the govern-
ment could compel a newspaper to publish that which the newspaper
otherwise chose not to publish.
An arresting aspect of Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court
in Tornillo was the attention and apparent sympathy given to the argu-
ments for access to the press: "In effect, it is claimed, the public has lost
any ability to respond or to contribute in a meaningful way to the debate
on issues."7 The Court set out the arguments for access in detail and
with accuracy.' These arguments, however, were just stated; they were
not rebutted.
Instead, the Court enunciated some general propositions that could
be read to apply to both the right of access and to the right of reply. The
press could not be required to publish what it reasonably did not wish to
publish.9 The Court saw no difference between government legislation
that forbade the press to publish and legislation that compelled it to pub-
lish: "The Florida statute operates as a command in the same sense as a
statute or regulation forbidding appellant to publish specified matter."'
Even more fundamentally, editorial autonomy, untrammeled by govern-
ment, was seen by the Court as a core precept of the First Amendment:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions
made as to the limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or un-
fair--constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has
yet to be demonstrated how government regulation of this crucial pro-
5. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla.), reh'g denied, 287 So.
2d 89 (Fla. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
6. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
7. Id. at 250.
8. Id. at 247-57.
9. Id. at 256.
10. Id.
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cess can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a
free press as they have evolved at this time.11
The rationale of Tornillo may be interpreted to apply both to a right
of access and to a right of reply; it is not clear. But it is clear that its
rationale was intended to govern the specific right of reply statute and
the facts that the case presented. In assessing the future of a right of
reply, it is necessary to focus on the nature of the right of reply statute
that was before the Court in Tornillo.
Tornillo did not deal with a private person's right of reply to attacks
in the press; it dealt with a state statute that afforded a right of reply to
political candidates who were attacked prior to an election in which they
were running. In Tornillo, the right of reply statute under consideration
did not require that a reply be afforded only if defamation were proven.12
Certainly the statute could have been given that gloss. But we neither
asked for that interpretation, nor did the Florida courts provide it.' a
Questions affecting a right of reply still exist-questions that the
Tornillo decision did not settle. For example, Tornillo did not deal with
the validity under the First Amendment of a right of reply statute di-
rected at providing a remedy for defamatory attack. 4 It also did not deal
with whether a statute that provided a right of nondiscriminatory access
to a newspaper's advertising pages would be valid. Could a newspaper be
required to open its pages to an advertiser whose message or product was
not illegal? Where this question has been raised in the lower courts on a
First Amendment basis, the answer has been in the negative. 5
11. Id. at 258.
12. Id.
13. The author was co-counsel in the Tornillo case with the late Tobias Simon, Esq., for
the respondent, Pat Tornillo.
14. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 (Brennan, J., concurring). It should be noted particularly
that Justice Brennan in Tornillo pointedly observed that the Court was not passing on the First
Amendment validity of retraction statutes. This observation suggests that he at least did not
reject as unconstitutional all mandatory publication legislation.
15. Only recently the West Virginia Supreme Court reversed a trial court's order requir-
ing a newspaper to publish a paid political advertisement submitted by a local PAC, or polit-
ical action committee. Citizen Awareness v. Calhoun County Publishing, Inc., 406 S.E.2d 65
(W. Va. 1991). A weekly newspaper, the Calhoun Chronicle, of Calhoun County, West Vir-
ginia, had a policy of refusing to print political advertisements in the last issue before an elec-
tion. Id. at 67. The PAC sought an injunction compelling the Calhoun Chronicle to publish
its ad. Id. The injunction was granted. Apparently the trial judge agreed with the PAC
counsel's argument "based on decency and fair play and basic sense of constitutional law." Id.
However, the trial court was reversed on the ground that the case was governed by Tornillo,
418 U.S. at 241. Judge Neely's opinion in Citizen Awareness reads as if the Tornillo case
incontrovertibly governs the matter in controversy. But it does not, because Tornillo dealt
with the editorial sections of the newspaper and not the open or advertising sections. Tornillo,
418 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring). However, Judge Neely noted that in the past the West
Virginia Supreme Court had recognized a right of access for political advertising when a state
1992]
In short, important questions about reply and access remain open in
our law. These include questions about the First Amendment validity of
a right of reply to defamatory attack and a right of nondiscriminatory
access to a newspaper's advertising pages. Nonetheless, the First
Amendment winds, so to speak, have not blown in the direction of the
rights of reply and access during the years since Tornillo.
16
II
Rights of Reply and Access in the Electronic Media
What about the rights of reply and access within the electronic me-
dia? In the case of the electronic media, as far as the formal statement of
the law goes, the Federal Communications Act recognizes some rights of
reply and access. The two most important of these rights are the equal
time rule17 and the reasonable access provision.18
Yet the rights afforded by these provisions are only available to
political candidates. The equal time rule is available to all political can-
didates; the reasonable access provision of section 312 is only available to
political candidates for federal office. The equal time rule is easily the
most significant right of reply in the electronic media. A candidate, in
deciding to exercise equal opportunities under section 315, can choose
whether or not to reply to the first use by his opponent. But even these
important rights are far from a recognition of a general right of reply to
the broadcast media.
The personal attack rules, which permit a person whose character is
attacked on a broadcast station to reply to the attack without cost, are
hanging by a thread. Under these rules, the person attacked must be
afforded a response if a broadcaster attacks the "honesty, character, or
controlled broadcast station was involved. Citizen Awareness, 406 S.E.2d at 68 (citing United
Mine Workers of America v. Parsons, 305 S.E.2d 343, 354 (W. Va. 1983)).
What puzzles me is that access to the print media is sometimes won on other than First
Amendment grounds. An interesting access-to-advertising case that was won not on First
Amendment grounds but on antitrust grounds is Home Placement Serv. v. Providence Jour-
nal, 682 F.2d 274, 281 (lst Cir. 1982). There, a newspaper could not refuse to accept
nondeceptive advertising from a rental referral business, consistent with the Sherman Act,
when the newspaper's classified pages were competing with the business. Id. at 277. In an-
other case, there was no such obligation on the part of a newspaper to accept such advertising
where the ads were criticized by readers as deceptive. Homefinders of America v. Providence
Journal, 621 F.2d 441, 444 (1st Cir. 1980).
16. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986). In the Pacific
Gas & Electric case, the Court's hostility to government requirements promoting debate was
apparent. The Court relied on Tornillo for a holding that a utility could not be required to
include in its billing envelope the message of a citizen's group, id. at 11, even though the utility
included its own newsletter in that billing envelope. Id. at 7.
17. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1991).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1991).
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integrity" of an identified person or group while discussing a controver-
sial issue of public importance. 9 The personal attack rules are a corol-
lary to the Fairness Doctrine, which was abolished by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) on August 4, 1987.20 The aban-
donment of the Fairness Doctrine was upheld by the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on February 10, 1989.21
However, the personal attack rules were not abolished, and complaints
under the personal attack rules are still being brought-albeit without
much success.
On November 7, 1991, the FCC dismissed a complaint by Professor
David Berkman who alleged a violation of the personal attack rule22 by a
radio station. During the Gulf war, a talk show host on the station had
said that Professor Berkman would not "be happy until we see Iraqi
soldiers jumping for joy."23 Professor Berkman felt this statement called
him a traitor to the United States and constituted an attack on his char-
acter and integrity. The FCC decided that comments made by WISN
concerning Professor Berkman's views on U.S. involvement in Kuwait
did not constitute a personal attack upon his "honesty, character, integ-
rity or like personal qualities."24 There is nothing in the FCC opinion,
however, which indicates that a personal attack violation could not have
been shown under a different set of facts.
On November 25, 1991, the FCC reviewed a complaint by an indi-
vidual alleging that WFBQ-FM, Indianapolis, Indiana, had violated the
personal attack rule by calling him a "Yankee Doodle Hitler" and com-
paring him to a Nazi. 25 In its response to the complaint, WFBQ-FM
argued that the personal attack rule was rendered invalid by the FCC's
decision in Syracuse Peace Council to abolish the Fairness Doctrine.26
19. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1991). The broadcaster must contact the person or group at-
tacked and provide a transcript or tape summarizing the attack and offer the person a reason-
able opportunity to respond over the same station without cost.
20. Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5057 (1987),
aJfd sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
21. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1019 (1990). See also Jerome A Barron, What Does the Fairness Doctrine Really Mean?,
12 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 205 (1989).
22. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1991).
23. Letter to Professor David Berkman, 6 F.C.C.R. 6640 (1991).
24. Id.
25. Letter to John Price, Esq., 6 F.C.C.R. 7122 (1991).
26. Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5057 (1987),
a.ffd sub nom Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
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The FCC responded to this contention by declining to reach a deter-
mination on the "continued validity of the personal attack rule."' 27 Nor
did the FCC believe it necessary to decide whether the alleged personal
attack occurred during a discussion of a controversial public issue, as the
rule requires. 2 Instead, the FCC believed it decisive that the radio sta-
tion, WFBQ-FM, had offered the complainant reply time on two occa-
sions. Therefore, since the station provided the complainant with an
opportunity to respond, the rule's requirement was satisfied.29
In each case, it should be noted that the FCC declined either to
reaffirm the personal attack rule or to declare it invalid. The implication
from the FCC treatment of these complaints is that the FCC-however
reluctantly-views the personal attack rule as still having the force of
law. This means that a new Executive administration that espoused a
philosophy of enforcing existing rights of reply and access in broadcast
law could make the personal attack rule a meaningful mechanism for
debate in broadcasting.
I have no doubt that if the equal time rule could have been charac-
terized as an administrative policy, then that rule also would have been
scuttled given the ascendant deregulatory philosophy at the FCC. How-
ever, the equal time rule is clearly established in a federal statute itself,30
so it was not possible for the FCC to fully implement its agenda of hand-
ing over every bit of air time to the industry. The only recent success in
the electronic media for participatory rights is the rapid rise in the
number of public access channels on cable. I discuss these developments,
and their relevance to a right of reply, in Section VII.
III
Consequences of No Right of Reply for the Defamation Law
Despite the judicial rejection of a right of reply to the press, the
common sense effort to provide individuals with an opportunity to reply
when attacked by a newspaper endures. It endures in the proposal that a
right of reply ought to be offered to the libel plaintiff by the media de-
fendant as an option to damages in libel suits. It endures as well in the
support that proposals for vindication statutes have received as well.
Perhaps the most recent and important statement emanating from
the Supreme Court in this regard-at least in the defamation context-is
the long concurrence of Justice White in Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Green-
27. Letter to John Price, Esq., 6 F.C.C.R. 7122 (1991).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1992).
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moss Builders, Inc.31 Justice White believes that current case law has
failed to protect the reputational interests of public officials in
particular.32
Justice White pointed out the difficulties that confronted a public
official who is a libel plaintiff and, therefore, subject to the rules of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.33 Unless the public official can meet the diffi-
cult actual malice standard imposed by that case, no jury verdict or judg-
ment can be won. This result will obtain even if the publisher admits
that the publication complained of is false: "The lie will stand, and the
public will continue to be misinformed about public matters.
' '34
The public official libel plaintiff faces other difficulties: "Even if the
plaintiff sues, he frequently loses on summary judgment or never gets to
the jury because of insufficient proof of malice. If he wins before the
jury, verdicts are often overturned by appellate courts for failure to prove
malice.",
35
In Justice White's view, the public official who is defamed today has
little ability to correct a falsehood that is published about him. Because
of the Times rules, the public official lacks an effective remedy to safe-
guard his reputation. Justice White said that there was no "justification
for leaving a whole class of defamed individuals without redress or a
realistic opportunity to clear their names."36 He went on to observe that
two adverse consequences flowed from this development:
[B]y leaving the lie uncorrected, the New York Times rule plainly
leaves the public official without a remedy for the damage to his repu-
tation .... The New York Times rule thus countenances two evils:
first, the stream of information about public officials and public affairs
is polluted and often remains polluted by false information; and sec-
ond, the reputation and professional life of the defeated plaintiff may
be destroyed by falsehoods that might have been avoided with a rea-
sonable effort to investigate the facts. In terms of the First Amend-
ment and reputational interests at stake, these seem grossly perverse
results.37
The libel law today, as many have observed, is being used to do
more than just protect reputation.38 One of its new functions has been to
31. 472 U.S. 749, 765 (1985). See generally Jerome A. Barron, The Search for Media
Accountability, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 789 (1985) (discussion of Justice White's concurrence).
32. 472 U.S. at 772.
33. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
34. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 768.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 768 n.2.
37. Id. at 769.
38. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 21; David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation and




serve as a means of media accountability. But the libel law is a clumsy
vehicle for such a purpose, awkward and expensive for both the libel
plaintiff and the media defendant. For the individual seeking a reply to a
defamatory attack, it is, of course, better than nothing. But the libel law
does not adequately meet the information needs of society at large.
The libel law has been used to make the media accountable only
because more adequate remedies such as vindication and reply do not
exist. Justice White's concurrence in Dun & Bradstreet cogently ex-
presses the inadequacies of our contemporary libel law. Implicitly, the
concurrence highlights the consequences that flow from refusal to recog-
nize a right of reply.39
These inadequacies include the lack of redress or the inability to
clear the names of "whole classes of defamed individuals."'  Such
classes of individuals not only include public officials but also private
plaintiffs who, unless they can at least prove negligence, can be "dam-
aged by even the most outrageous falsehoods [and still be] remediless." 4'
In sum, Justice White believes that the Supreme Court in the name
of the First Amendment has created barriers too high for defamation
plaintiffs to hurdle. He suggests that it might be more sensible to limit
damage recoveries in libel cases and dispense with the increased burdens
of proof fashioned by the Court, respectively, in New York Times42 in the
case of public libel plaintiffs,43 and in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' as
applied to private libel plaintiffs.45
The Times-Gertz rules have moved our law along a path where the
absence of a right of reply is particularly noticeable.46 One of the major
consequences of the rules is that a plaintiff may lose a defamation case
because she cannot prove actual malice even though the communication
that impelled her to sue is in fact false. These rules have greatly affected
public official plaintiffs. Obviously, right of reply legislation would create
the means for people to clear their names.
39. 472 U.S. at 801-02.
40. Id. at 768.
41. Id. at 770.
42. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
43. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 765-70.
44. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
45. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 770-74.
46. Id. at 765. There are a number of ways in which the Times-Gertz rules have dimin-
ished the usefulness of the libel law for plaintiffs who seek to clear their names through the
defamation law. Justice White provided an example in his concurrence in Dun & Bradstreet.
He observed that the prevailing common law rule before New York Times that nominal dam-
ages were to be awarded for any actionable defamatory publication per se performed a vindica-
tory function. But the requirement in Gertz effectively undercut this rule. See id. at 770.
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Several years after New York Times v. Sullivan47 was announced I
criticized the Times doctrine.4" I called it a lost opportunity. The
Court's desire to promote debate by freeing newspapers from the intimi-
dating effects of heavy damages made sense only if debate would result
from that liberation. But the Court abdicated its task in protecting de-
bate too soon; it did not require some right of reply or access. The Court
simply assumed that debate would take place.49 The consequence of this
assumption, I felt, would not be more debate but a new imbalance in the
communications process. The pattern of concentration of control of the
media stemmed from centrifugal forces with deep roots in technology
and the economic system.
The irony of Times and its progeny, I argued, lay in the unexamined
assumption that reducing newspaper exposure to libel litigation would
remove restraints on expression and lead to an "informed society."5 But
in fact, I believed, the decision would create a new imbalance in the com-
munications process. Purporting to deepen the constitutional guarantee
of full expression, the actual effect of the decision would be to perpetuate
the freedom of a few in a manner adverse to the public interest in unin-
hibited debate.51 Unless the Times doctrine were deepened to require
opportunities for the public figure to reply to a defamatory attack, the
Times decision that would merely serve to equip the press with some new
and rather heavy artillery which can crush as well as stimulate debate.52
I regret to say that this forecast has proven correct. The press has
provided some indirect opportunities for reply and access in op-ed pages
that were not present in the newspaper press prior to the Tornillo case.53
The establishment by some newspapers of an ombudsman, while hardly a
uniform practice among newspapers in this country, shows some concern
for the rights of the public in the media that serves it. Nonetheless, un-
less a newspaper chooses voluntarily to provide a reply, there is still no
opportunity for the public figure to reply to a defamatory attack by a
daily newspaper in the United States today. 54
47. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
48. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.





53. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
54. For an interesting legislative proposal that would provide not for a right of reply
statute but for a rapid retraction, see generally Dale M. Cendali, Note, Of Things to Come-
The Actual Impact of Herbert v. Lando and a Proposed National Correction Statute, 22 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 441, 500-02 (1985).
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IV
The Vindication Remedy-A Reply of Sorts
The theory behind the Times standard is to free the press from the
chilling effect of large damage awards. Justice White has asked-some-
what acidly-whether the press alone among American businesses
should be immunized from the damage it causes." But assuming that it
should, he argues that a vindication remedy is particularly appropriate:
"Nothing in the central rationale behind New York Times demands an
absolute immunity from suits to establish the falsity of a defamatory mis-
statement about a public figure where the plaintiff cannot make out a
jury case of actual malice."
' 56
There is a connection between a vindication remedy and a right of
reply. If vindication were accompanied by a duty on the part of the de-
famer to publish the reply, we would be on our way to a modified right of
reply. In short, if it is desirable for the states to enact legislation to per-
mit a defamation plaintiff a judgment of falsity even absent proof of ac-
tual malice, it is also desirable that the media defendant that published
the false statement should be required to publish the vindication. One
may argue that they would do so voluntarily, but then again, they might
not.
Let me put the issue presented as directly as possible. If a court has
determined that what was published or broadcast by a media defendant
was false, should the defendant be required to publish in its paper (or
broadcast on its television station) that a court has determined that its
statement was false? In such circumstances, mandatory publication is
only basic fairness. Most vindication proposals, however, do not go this
far.
5 7
A well-known proposal, Professor Marc Franklin's "restoration"
remedy, would allow vindication of a defamation plaintiff but would not
require mandatory publication of the vindication.5" Professor Franklin
would require the plaintiff to make a choice at the outset between pursu-
ing damages or seeking a "restoration" of reputation remedy. 9 If the
"restoration" of reputation remedy is selected, the plaintiff must show
that his request for a retraction was rejected. The plaintiff must also
55. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 772.
56. Id.
57. Despite Justice White's sympathy for a vindication remedy for the falsely defamed
public official in his Dun & Bradstreet concurrence, he did not suggest that the vindication
must be published in the same forum where the original defamation took place, even though he
observed that the retraction rarely catches up with the lie. Id. at 768-69.
58. Marc Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal,
18 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1983).
59. Id.
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prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's statements
concerning the plaintiff were deliberately or recklessly false.' Under the
Franklin proposal, if the plaintiff meets the requisite standard of proof,
the plaintiff can recover attorney's fees from the defendant.6'
Another proposed vindication statute would require mandatory
publication. James H. Hulme proposed a two-step "vindication remedy"
under which the plaintiff could secure from the defendant an acknowl-
edgement that he has made false statements about the plaintiff.62 First, a
declaratory hearing would be held to determine whether the statements
were true or false. 63 If the statements were found to be false, the court
would require the defendant to publish that a declaratory judgment had
been rendered in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of the falsity of the
statement.64 The scope and form of the defendant's publication would be
within the court's discretion.65 Furthermore, if the plaintiff were suc-
cessful in proving that the challenged statements were false, the plaintiff
would possibly be able to recover attorney's fees from the defendant.66
V
Vindication Contrasted With Reply
A vindication remedy is better than no opportunity at all to clear
one's name, but it is not a totally adequate remedy. Assume that a plain-
tiff has been attacked in a forum-in a newspaper or on radio or on tele-
vision-in a manner that reaches an audience in the hundreds of
thousands. A vindication judgment known only to the plaintiff's family
hardly seems adequate recompense for the reputational interest involved
in the First Amendment debate issue.
If we are interested in having the public hear both sides of the issue,
then the attack and the judicial determination of its truth or falsity
should reach the same audience. A right of reply is a fuller and more
adequate remedy for defamatory attack than is the vindication remedy,
unless the latter is accompanied by a requirement of mandatory
publication.
Yet even advocates of the right of reply remedy do not always de-
mand mandatory publication. The Annenberg Proposal, a recent libel
60. Id. at 42.
61. Id.
62. James H. Hulme, Vindicating Reputation: An Alternative to Damages as a Remedy for
Defamation, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 375 (1981).
63. Id. at 408.
64. Id. at 410.
65. Id. at 410-11.
66. Id. at 411.
1992]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
reform proposal that has attracted considerable discussion in media cir-
cles, provided for a right of reply as an alternative to defamation damage
suits. 67 The Annenberg Proposal makes a right of reply to defamation
available to the plaintiff only upon the defendant's consent. It would
require the libel plaintiff to seek a retraction or an opportunity to reply
from the defendant before filing suit.6 s If the defendant grants the plain-
tiff's request within thirty days, the plaintiff cannot bring a damage
suit. 69 If the plaintiff demands a retraction, the defendant can only avoid
a damage suit by publishing "a good faith [statement] of the facts, with-
drawing and repudiating the prior defamatory statements."'7 If the
plaintiff demands a reply, the defendant can avoid a damage suit by pub-
lishing a retraction or a reply written by the plaintiff.7' Both retractions
and replies must be published in "substantially the same place and man-
ner as the defamatory statements.
'72
The Annenberg Proposal contains a vindication feature as well,
which Professor Dienes has well summarized:
Under the proposed Libel Reform Act, if no satisfactory retraction or
reply is published, we move to Stage Two. This is where the real con-
troversy is centered. At Stage Two, either party may finally convert
the claim into a no-fault, declaratory judgment action on the issue of
truth or falsity. If either party elects the declaratory judgment route,
that is conclusive-there can be no damages action. The prevailing
party on the issue of truth or falsity gets attorney's fees from the
loser.73
There have been other proposals providing for a right of reply only
where the media defendant consents to such a remedy, 74 as well as pro-
posals that require the defendant to publish a right of reply.75 A pro-
posed "reply-retraction" statute requires any publisher of a false
statement to publish a retraction within a reasonable time upon demand
of the subject of the statement.76 In that proposal, a publisher of opinion
concerning a person must publish the reply of that person within a rea-
67. The Annenberg Washington Program, Proposal for the Reform of Libel Law, Report
of the Libel Reform Project of the Annenberg Washington Program § 3(i) (1988).
68. Id. § 3(a)(1)-(2).
69. Id. § 3.
70. Id. § 3(b).
71. Id. § 3(i).
72. Id. § 3(0.
73. C. Thomas Dienes, Libel Reform: An Appraisal, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1, 5 (1989).
74. Indeed, I have made such a proposal in the belief that an optional right of reply rem-
edy is preferable to none at all. The proposal is discussed in Barron, supra note 31, at 805-14.
75. On the question of whether a right of reply that is not a right enforceable by a plaintiff
can even be called a "right," see John G. Fleming, Retraction and Reply: Alternative Remedies
for Defamation, 12 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 15, 24 (1978).
76. See George E. Frasier, Note, An Alternative to the General-Damage Award for Defa-
mation, 20 STAN. L. REV. 504, 531-37 (1968).
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sonable time or publish a retraction." A reply cannot exceed the
number of words in the original statement.78 If the publisher refuses the
plaintiff's request for publication of a reply or retraction, the plaintiff can
obtain a court order directing publication of a reply or retraction.79 Such
publication would in that event be the exclusive remedy for the injury to
reputation-damages would not be available.8 0 In short, this proposal
would allow the plaintiff to choose reply or retraction over damages as a
remedy, whether the defendant consented to that choice or not.81
What is the reason for the reluctance to require a mandatory publi-
cation of reply? What is the reason for the reluctance even to require
publication of judgments vindicating the libel plaintiff? Does the Court's
reluctance arise from the respect for property deeply rooted in the com-
mon law tradition? In the oral argument in Tornillo, I suggested that the
newspapers regarded their pages as their plantation and nothing to which
they did not consent could be published there. I called this the planta-
tion concept of the First Amendment. As I recall, Justice Rehnquist re-
sponded, "Is that such a naive conception?"
Now, nearly twenty years later, the idea that the media can be
treated as the inviolate property of their owners has proven to be a naive
conception. Damages can place in jeopardy the property of the pub-
lisher. Damages are a form of coercion and a more expensive and intimi-
dating form of coercion than mandatory publication of reply. If damages
in libel cases do not violate the First Amendment, then less onerous rem-
edies such as vindication statutes and reply statutes surely should be con-
sidered to pass constitutional muster.
VI
The Quest for a Participatory Media
There is a relationship between the absence of a right of reply and
the uses to which the law of libel is put. The new interest in vindication
statutes 2 and in affording a right of reply to the libel plaintiff illustrates
that enactment of legislation to implement these new rights may yet
occur.
77. Id. at 531.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 534.
80. Id. at 536.
81. Id.
82. For a thorough and thoughtful account of recent proposals for vindication and retrac-
tion, see David Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 487, 490-92
(1991).
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The right of access and the right of reply have not died. In fact,
they have proven more lively than anyone would have dreamed. The
stubborn resistance of the establishment media to open up their doors to
the public they presumably serve is as rigid as ever. The media have won
victory after victory in the years from Tornillo in 1974 to the demise of
broadcasting's Fairness Doctrine in 1987.83 It is all proof of the adage-
one more victory like this and we are undone.
The Ross Perot phenomenon, that of leaping over the establishment
media-the pundits of The New York Times and The Washington Post,
and the Sam Donaldsons of commercial television and the Linda
Wertheimers of public broadcasting-in order to try to reach the citi-
zenry directly through radio talk shows demonstrates the public's hunger
for participatory media.
Indeed, all the 1992 Presidential candidates-George Bush, Bill
Clinton, and Ross Perot-have eagerly appeared on talk shows like Don-
ahue and CNN's Larry King Live to submit themselves to questions from
the audience. These shows vividly demonstrate the depth of the public's
desire to speak with its own voice. The immense audience that was at-
tracted to the Presidential debate format, where ABC television reporter
Carol Simpson acted not as questioner of the candidates but as modera-
tor for questions from the voters themselves, further illustrates this phe-
nomenon. In short, the call-in radio and television talk show, like the
public access cable channel, demonstrates not only an insistence by the
public on a right of reply but also an insistence on a right to speak.
We are witnessing an insistence on creating a nation of speakers.
Citizens are no longer willing to be talked at. The Perot phenomenon is
more than a passing political nonevent. It is the coming of age of a per-
vasive mood sweeping through the electorate that a permanently passive
role in the opinion process is unacceptable.
The networks and the daily newspapers have succeeded in making
their forums their own preserve. No admission tickets are given out as of
right. Indeed, any development which might open the process is legally
resisted. No expense is spared to keep the viewer and the reader out.
Only radio is different, due perhaps to its desperate economic situation.
AM radio had been thoroughly routed by FM radio, by VHF television,
and by cable television. As a last desperate effort to- stay alive, radio
sought out its audience and invited it in. Hungry to speak, the public
responded. Radio achieved an importance that staggers those who did
not even deign to think of it as a competitor.
83. See Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5057
(1987), affid sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir 1989), cert.
denied, Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
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In short, the closed house the newspaper press has so successfully
built for itself may all be for naught. It may be that the daily newspa-
pers, so jealous of their absolute dominion over their pages, will fall to
the telecommunications industry as that industry begins to provide its
own information and video services. It remains to be seen whether the
telecommunications industry will adhere to the common carrier model or
instead will insist that they are publishers, like newspapers, with absolute
dominion over their telephone lines.
When I speak of the common carrier model, I refer to a communica-
tions entity which is operated on the basis that it is open to all comers.
The users of the carrier provide the content that the carrier will transmit.
By definition, the users have access to the carrier. In the case of a com-
mon carrier like the telephone company, for example, the users provide
the content that the carrier will transmit. In the case of a newspaper
publisher, the content is not provided by users, but by the publisher and
the journalists he employs. In the newspaper context, nondiscriminatory
access with respect to the content to be transmitted is considered to be at
war with the editorial function. Tornillo illustrates this principle. How-
ever, we have not thought of common carriers, such as telephone compa-
nies, as editors at all. The access principle of the common carrier is not
in conflict with editorial autonomy. Indeed, the latter concept is a stran-
ger to its regulatory tradition. In short, the common carrier model is a
paradigm of the access principle. The publisher model, on the other
hand, is in essence animated by the editorial principle.8 4
A common carrier model would implement public access because it
is comprised of new video and information services offered by the tele-
phone companies on a nondiscriminatory open-to-all basis. The only re-
quirement for entry would be payment of the rate. An alternative model
would be to apply a publisher model to traditional common carriers such
as telephone companies which for the first time would be in the business
of originating information. In my view, the application of a publisher
model to the point of letting telephone company common carriers en-
gaged in disseminating information and video services entirely dictate the
composition or content of the traffic would be extremely undesirable. In-
stead, it would seem wiser to retain the access principle that, after all, is
native to the common carrier context.
84. See generally ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 106-07 (1983).
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VII
A Success for Public Participatory Rights in the
Media: The Case of Public Access Cable
The public access channels on cable television have successfully im-
plemented the idea of access and reply. Cable television is the one impor-
tant communications medium where public access exists. In some
measure, this is a consequence of the failure of our law to recognize a
right of reply. Indeed, courts have recognized the validity of public ac-
cess requirements in municipal franchise agreements despite First
Amendment challenges. These challenges have stressed the absolute edi-
torial dominion of cable operators over the majority of their channels. s5
The ability of cable systems to exclude subject matter not to their liking
is relied on as an argument for the recognition of the validity of public
access channels on cable.
Those courts that have upheld public access channels against First
Amendment challenge have emphasized the abundance of channels on
cable as an argument for public access.8 6 Usually scarcity has been asso-
ciated with regulation and obligation. But in cable, abundance has be-
come an argument for obligation. Given the sheer abundance of
channels and the editorial dominion that the cable operator has over
most of them, the reservation of a few channels for public access pur-
poses is no real editorial intrusion. 7
Thus, in Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie,"8 the court
held:
Although the record reveals that the number of cable channels in ac-
tive use is less than the required minimum capacity, the Court finds it
of critical importance that [the cable system] maintains complete edito-
rial control over a substantial majority of its potential cable system.
85. Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 988 (D.R.I. 1983); accord, Erie
Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580, 600-01 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
86. As one court has held:
Rhode Island requires cable operators only to set aside no more than seven of their
50 or more channels for public access. Cable operators retain complete editorial con-
trol over the remaining channels and can use any of these channels to express their
own views. Mandatory access regulations thus result in only a minimal intrusion on
cable operators' First Amendment activities.
Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 988.
In Erie Telecommunications, 659 F. Supp. at 580, the court attributed similar significance
to the abundance of channel capacity possessed by the cable operator challenging public access
requirements. The court wrote, "[T]he franchise agreement provides that [the cable system]
must make available thirteen channels for the public use. These thirteen access channels are to
be part of a cable system comprising a minimum capacity of eighty-four downstream chan-
nels." Id. at 600-01.
87. Erie Telecommunications, 659 F. Supp. at 601.
88. 659 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
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The instant mandatory access regulations produce only a minimal in-
trusion on [the cable system's] exercise of first amendment rights.8 9
Later the court stated again: "[The cable system] can claim no first
amendment injury as it possesses no editorial control over the dissemina-
tions broadcast on [the cable system's] dedicated access channels."'
A right of public access to some cable channels has been specifically
justified on the ground that such access is less intrusive with respect to
the editorial function than mandatory response mechanisms like the
Fairness Doctrine. In Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke,91 the court sus-
tained a regulation of a Rhode Island administrative agency requiring
cable operators to designate and reserve at least seven public access cable
channels.92 These channels were to be reserved for educational and gov-
ernmental purposes. Furthermore, at least one of the channels had to be
dedicated "for use by members of the general public on a first-come, first-
served nondiscriminatory basis and without charge." 93 In Berkshire
Cablevision, the court contrasted access channels with the newspaper
right of reply statute struck down in Tornillo94 and broadcasting's Fair-
ness Doctrine upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,95 and found that
access presented fewer problems, and fewer intrusions, than reply:
96
Mandatory access requirements are even less intrusive on First
Amendment freedoms than the fairness doctrine upheld by the
Supreme Court in Red Lion. Because the fairness doctrine requires
broadcasters to present both sides of every issue of public importance,
broadcasters may choose to avoid coverage of controversial issues
rather than be forced to devote considerable time to opposition spokes-
men.... Mandatory access requirements, by contrast, do not pose
such a threat; they require only that all individuals be given an oppor-
tunity to air their views on a first-come, first-served basis. Access re-
quirements, therefore, further, rather than inhibit, the presentation of
important, controversial issues.
9 7
Public access on cable furthers debate and yet is not perceived as a
threat to editorial autonomy. Why is a right of reply seen as more men-
acing? The aversion to a right of reply in our law appears to be based on
a policy to keep editorial autonomy as unrestrained as possible. Where
public access channels on cable have been challenged and the public ac-
cess requirements upheld, the courts have essentially responded to the
89. Id. at 601.
90. Id.
91. 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983).
92. Id. at 998.
93. Id. at 979.
94. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
95. 395 U.S. 367, 392-93 (1969).
96. Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 988.
97. Id.
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First Amendment objections of the cable operators by saying, "Look,
you have so much channel capacity, allowing the dedication of a few
channels to the community will clearly further the First Amendment in-
terest in debate, and yet such dedication in no way limits anything you
might want to say."
In the case of a right of reply to the press or broadcasters, however,
the argument appears to be that there is a real clash between editorial
autonomy and public debate. Where mandatory reply has been sought,
the media and the courts have chosen editorial autonomy over the public
interest in promoting debate. In my view, this has been a misguided
choice. It has not benefitted the established media. The newspaper and
broadcasting industries are still important but no longer all-powerful.
These media are not only threatened by the mighty new technology of
cable, but also affected by the emerging technologies of satellite transmis-
sion, digital radio and television, and the foreseeable entry into video
services of the regional telephone companies.98
The established media are also threatened by public mistrust. The
expensive legal effort of the established media to be free of legal obliga-
tion in the years since the New York Times case has been pushed with
relentless and undeviating absolutism. This has bred in the public a feel-
ing that the established media are closed to them. It is not too late for
the established media to take steps toward opening their houses to the
public they serve. For example, when proposals are made for a right of a
reply in lieu of damages, reflexive opposition should be abandoned in
favor of thoughtful support. 99
A right of reply is important. A right of access to public channels
on cable cannot meet all the needs that an effective right of reply can
serve. Public access meets different needs. It gives the members of the
public the choice to speak to each other without an interpreter and with-
out a mediator. A right of reply provides the opportunity to respond in
the same forum and before the same audience where the attack was origi-
nally made. Such a requirement is elementary fair play. A right of reply
is an indispensable condition for full, fair, and free debate.
98. For an account of the joint effort by the newspaper industry, the cable industry, and
others to keep the Baby Bells-the regional telephone companies-out of the business of pro-
viding information services, see Stuart Taylor, Jr., Fight for the Future, AM. LAW., Apr. 1992,
at 50.
99. Professor David Anderson suggests the media bar may also be an obstacle to the
recognition of new remedies for libel. See Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, supra
note 82, at 490-91.
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